Trust is an important concept that intersects a number of different disciplines, including economics, sociology, and political science, and maintains some meaning even in the natural sciences. Any situation where non-simultaneous exchanges between living organisms take place involves a problem of trust. We used computer simulations to study the evolution of trust in non-simultaneous exchange situations formalized by means of a Trust game. We found that trust and reciprocity-based cooperation are likely to emerge only when agents have the possibility of building trustworthy reputations and when the information regarding agents' past behaviors is sufficiently spread in the system. Both direct and indirect reciprocity play a role in fostering cooperation. However, the strength of the latter is greater under most of the examined conditions. In general, our findings are consistent with theories arguing for a positive feedback relationship between trust, reputation, and reciprocity, leading together to higher levels of cooperation.
Introduction
Trust is an important (though elusive) concept that intersects a number of different disciplines, including economics, sociology, and political science, and maintains some meaning even in the natural sciences. Any situation where non-simultaneous exchanges between living organisms take place involves a problem of trust. In a non-simultaneous exchange a subject bears a cost in order to provide a benefit to a different subject, who subsequently may or may not reciprocate. Interesting examples of non-simultaneous exchanges come from the natural sciences. One of the most well-known cases is food sharing among South American vampire bats. In bat colonies, individuals that have eaten sufficiently often share (by regurgitating part of the consumed blood) some of their surplus with their less fortunate fellows. The beneficiaries will subsequently reciprocate this behavior, even if (most of the time) not directly to the helper (Wilkinson 1984) . Food sharing is common among chimpanzee and other primate groups as well (McGrew and Feistner 1992) . Also in the Homo genus there are sound reasons to believe that before the introduction of money -which, from an evolutionary perspective, only happened recently -non-simultaneous exchanges were far more common than simultaneous ones. Non-simultaneous exchange problems represented therefore a probable shaping force of human nature (Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Hammerstein 2003; Kurzban 2003) .
In contemporary societies, human beings often employ some form of institutional enforcement in order to strengthen the mutual commitment of subjects sequentially exchanging valuable goods or services. However, in many relevant cases, the building of institutions involves high transaction costs and is a non-trivial achievement. Moreover, even when institutions exist, the cost of their functioning may be too high to permit effective enforcement (see Taylor and Singleton 1993) . This explains why nonsimultaneous exchanges in the absence of institutional enforcement are nowadays common especially among relatives, friends and associates, for instance in mutual help or lending situations. However, non-simultaneous exchanges also play an important role in other circumstances, including situations of relevant economic interest (see Hardin 2000) . For instance, contracts between firms in a knowledge-based economy often take the form of non-simultaneous exchanges, where trust and reputation represent major contract enforcement instruments. Paul Adler (2001) argued that in cases where firms need not merely standard commodities from their suppliers but also 'innovation and knowledge inputs', hierarchical control and market instruments cannot ensure a level of performance as high as 'trustbased community' does.
Transactions on internet auction platforms represent another interesting issue. In this case, buyers usually pay in advance for the desired commodity while sellers will ship it only after receiving payment. In this situation a transaction will occur only if the buyer trusts the seller to actually ship it. Since external enforcement is weak (if not completely absent), the only elements backing internet buyers are the sellers' reputation and the sellers' desire to maintain it at a level high enough to assure future profitable transactions (Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002) .
The aforementioned situations represent only a few examples of a much larger set of empirical cases of non-simultaneous exchange situations involving a problem of trust. This class of situations is often modeled by means of a prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. However, this formalization obscures the fact that the interaction is both non-simultaneous and asymmetrical: the first subject decides whether to enter the exchange or not, later the second one chooses between playing fairly or taking advantage of the first subject's trust. More specifically, the first subject acts in a trustor position, while the second one acts in a trustee position. The probability of starting the exchange depends crucially on the first subject's estimation of the trustworthiness of the second one. Moreover, the consequences of a non-cooperative move are different for the two subjects. If the first decides not to trust the second, no exchange takes place and the two players achieve neither benefits nor losses. On the other hand, if the second subject cheats the first one, he/she can obtain a good payoff while the first one bears heavy losses (Coleman 1990; Dasgupta 1988) . A model that better reproduces the structure of interaction underlying a non-simultaneous exchange is the so-called Trust game (hereafter TG), which is basically an asymmetric sequential PD (see Figure 1 and below) and represents the current standard of formalization for this class of social situations (Buskens 1998; Dasgupta 1988; Diekmann and Przepiorka 2005; Lahno 1995; McCabe and Smith 2000; Snijders and Kerens 1998) .
More generally, the study of the evolution of trust and reciprocity in non-simultaneous exchange situations modeled by means of a TG represents the focal point of this article. Using an evolutionary algorithm, we found that trust and reciprocity-based cooperation are likely to emerge only when agents have the possibility of building trustworthy reputations and when the information regarding agents' past behaviors is sufficiently spread in the system. Direct and indirect reciprocity both play a role in fostering cooperation in this setting. However, the strength of indirect reciprocity is greater under most of the examined conditions. In general, our findings support Elinor Ostrom's (1998) model of a positive feedback relationship between trust, reputation, and reciprocity.
The article is organized as follows. The next (second) section presents the theoretical background of the study, the third introduces the model by describing its basic structure and the different experimental conditions, the fourth section illustrates the results, while the last one is devoted to the discussion.
Theoretical Background

The Trust Game
Situations involving trust represent a subclass of the broader category of situations involving risk. More specifically, in situations involving trust, the risk borne by one actor depends crucially on the actions of (at least) one other actor (Coleman 1990: 91) . A simple definition of the concept is given by Partha Dasgupta (1999: 330) , who uses trust 'in the context of an individual forming expectations about actions of others that have a bearing on this individual's choice of action, when that action must be chosen before he or she can observe the actions of those others'. In order to model this class of situations, we will use the Trust game presented in Figure 1 . In this game, Player I moves first, either right or down. If he/she moves right, both players receive the 'punishment' payoff P = 1 point and the interaction stops. If he/she moves down, Player II must, in turn, choose between moving right or down. If Player II moves right, he/she receives the 'temptation' payoff T = 5 points, while Player I receives the 'sucker' payoff S = 0 points. If Player II moves down, both players receive the 'reward' payoff R = 3 points. in a trustor position and the parameter p ∈ [0,1], which formally represents the probability of his/her down move, can also be interpreted as a measure of his/her trust in Player II's cooperation. The second player acts instead in a trustee position, with the parameter q ∈ [0,1] formally representing the probability of his/her down move and, more generally, his/her trustworthiness. In a one shot game, it is in the interest of Player I to move down as long as qR + (1 − q)S > P. However, since T > R, Player II will rationally move right. Knowing that (which is equivalent to set q = 0), Player I will always choose to move right. Consequently, the situation where Player I moves right and the interaction stops represents the only rational equilibrium of the game with pure strategies.
Despite this straightforward prediction, it is worth noting that Player II can achieve a payoff higher than the equilibrium one if he/she moves down with a probability sufficiently high to make profitable a down move also from Player I. In order to work, this strategy must be known by Player I, either via direct communication or through observation of Player II's past moves. From the inequality above, it follows that Player I will move down only if his/her estimation of the probability of a down move by Player II is
The inequality (1) represents a critical threshold, since above it Player I has a rational incentive to cooperate (for more details, see the analysis of the game in McCabe and Smith 2000 and Snijders and Kerens 1998) . Knowing this, Player II will be better off by using a mixed strategy that makes him/her cooperate with probability , where ε is any small figure strictly greater than zero. In this case, the expected payoff for Player I is greater than P and the final outcome is hence Pareto-superior to the equilibrium one with pure strategies. Notice that the possibility for both players to reach a higher payoff by using mixed strategies represents a major difference between the TG and the one shot or finitely repeated PD, where this is not possible.
2
An interesting case is represented by a situation where many agents play a repeated TG, changing partner in every round and having no information about the partner's past behavior. In this setting, a collective action problem arises for agents in the second player position. Second players are collectively better off by defecting only if
where p -and q -represent the average p and q respectively. This implies (2) a figure that represents the second crucial threshold of the game. However, as seen above, to make profitable a down move for first players the condition expressed by the inequality (1) must be satisfied. This can result either from all second players using a mixed strategy with or from any other combination of pure and mixed strategies able to satisfy the inequality. In other words, in order to keep q -(and hence p -) above the threshold, second players cannot always defect. However, since T > R and since agents cannot rationally expect to meet again their current partners, for all second players it individually pays to defect any time a first player moves down, independently of the other player strategies. This represents a collective action problem for second players, because their defection leads also to the defection of first players and to the achievement of only the Pareto-inferior equilibrium payoff. More generally, as noted by Russel Hardin (2000: 18) , a 'generalized trustworthiness' (formalized here by a high q -) has the character of a collective or a public good: in order to be collectively better off, second players should hence produce this public good by cooperating often enough to provide a rational incentive also for the cooperation of first players.
Past Research on Direct and Indirect Reciprocity
In a repeated interaction setting, the dynamics of the TG present both similarities with and differences from those of the iterated PD game. While a systematic analysis of the differences between the two games will be given below, since most of the past literature has concentrated on the PD it is now worth presenting some of the basic findings related to this game. A seminal work on cooperation in PD-type situations is Robert Axelrod's (1981 Axelrod's ( , 1984 ) study on the evolution of cooperation. Axelrod found that cooperation in a repeated PD is possible as long as the 'shadow of the future', i.e. the prospect of mutually advantageous future interactions, extends enough to promote the establishment of reciprocity-based behaviors (e.g. the well-known tit-for-tat, hereafter TFT). The trouble is (even without considering Binmore's 1994 and Nachbar's 1992 radical criticisms of Axelrod's work) that in order to create a sufficient shadow of the future, a high number of consecutive interactions between the same two players is usually needed.
It is clear that this condition is not necessarily (and perhaps not frequently) met in the real world, among both human beings (Fehr and Henrich 2003) and other animals (Hammerstein 2003) . Subsequent work by Axelrod and colleagues tried to address this point by introducing the role of 'social structures' into the analysis (Cohen et al. 2001) . However, those studies further strengthen the point that tight social clusters, where interactions between the same players are frequent and repeated, are needed in order to foster cooperation. Moreover, other studies have shown that even when the conditions for the successful development of reciprocitybased strategies are met, the outcome of the evolutionary process is not the steady domination of the TFT strategy, but rather its substitution with more 'generous' ones and, consequently, the return of always defecting players in an endless pattern of cooperation and defection cycles (Nowak and Sigmund 2004; Poulsen and Poulsen 2006) .
It is worth noting that the results above arose from an unusual process of cross-fertilization between the social and natural sciences. Starting with Robert Trivers' (1971) seminal article, a number of biological works analyzed the conditions for the evolution of 'reciprocal altruism'. More specifically, to engender reciprocal altruism behaviors, organisms must (i) have repeated interaction, (ii) be able to distinguish between individuals and to discriminate between cooperators and non-cooperators, and (iii) have sufficient information-processing capabilities and behavioral flexibility in order to relate with other organisms on the basis of the results of past interactions (Kurzban 2003: 111-13) .
While those findings highlight the importance of behaviors that are both discriminating and reactive, they do not overcome the limitation of the direct reciprocity concept: the necessity of repeated interaction between the same subjects. On the other hand, the indirect reciprocity concept (Alexander 1987 ) opens a way out of the problem. Martin Nowak and Karl Sigmund showed that through 'image scoring' individual selection can favor the evolution of cooperative strategies even if the exchanges between the interacting subjects are neither repeated nor simultaneous (Nowak and Sigmund 1998a,b) . By image scoring the authors simply denoted the attribution to each player of a score, which is directly proportional to his/her cooperative past behavior. If players are able to modify their behavior as a function of the image of their opponents, it pays to invest in increasing their own score. Since the only possible investment takes the form of cooperative behavior, image scoring permits the successful emergence and maintenance of high cooperation levels even when direct reciprocal strategies are ruled out.
Image scoring is a close relative of reputation. A number of experimental studies have shown the huge effect of indirect reciprocity strategies, based on other players' 'images' or 'reputations', on cooperative behaviors. For instance, Manfred Milinski and colleagues (2002) presented an experiment based on the alternation of public good and indirect reciprocity games in order to simulate common-pool resource management problems. Their study shows that the need to maintain a good reputation for the indirect reciprocity game leads to high contribution levels in the public good game too, and hence reputation exerts an important and positive effect on individual cooperation. In another experiment, Ingrid Seinen and Arthur Schram (2006) showed that indirect reciprocity is an important motivation affecting the behavior of subjects in the laboratory. In this study, subjects played a repeated Helping game in groups of 28 for at least 90 rounds. In each period, they were placed in pairs and played the game either as 'donor' or as 'recipient', where the donor had to decide whether to help the recipient at a cost to herself or to 'pass', avoiding the cost but also giving no benefit to the recipient (note that the donor cost was less than the recipient benefit). The authors showed that introducing the possibility of knowing the recipient actions of the past 6 rounds drastically increased the helping frequency in the game and explained this result as a clear effect of reputation-based strategies on individual behaviors.
The weight of reputation in various social dilemma situations is confirmed also by a number of theoretical works. Werner Raub and Jeroen Weesie (1990) analyze the effect of information for agents playing a supergame formed by multiple simultaneous PDs. Their basic finding is that the more reliable information agents possess on the actions that their current partners performed with other agents, the easier it is to sustain cooperation in the system. This result anticipated the similar effect of information found by Nowak and Sigmund (1998a,b) using instead an indirect reciprocity game akin to the Helping game described above. Overall, the main insight of these works is clearly that the possibility of having a reliable picture of opponents' past behavior represents a necessary condition for the development of reputation-based strategies.
Nobuyuki Takahashi (2002) uses a computer simulation in order to study the dynamics of reputation in a 'generalized exchange' situation, where each agent confronts the choice of 'giving' or not its endowment to another agent in a setting similar to the Helping game described above. Takahashi concludes that generalized exchange (i.e. cooperation) can emerge in a society with no initial cooperators even when each agent only knows the past behavior of other agents acting in its spacial neighborhood, which represent only a small subset of the entire 'society'. Takahashi basically replicated, in a slightly different setting, the Nowak and Sigmund (1998b) finding of the evolution of discriminating strategies: at the end of the simulation most of Takahashi's agents give their endowment to their partners if and only if the latter did the same in the previous round, just as Nowak and Sigmund's agents evolve a strategy of cooperation limited to the owners of a good image score.
It is worth noting that Takahashi's agents possess also a 'tolerance gene' that influences their discriminating capabilities. More specifically, an agent i chooses to give its endowment g i ∈ [0,10] to its current partner j if and only if j gave at least g i × t i in the previous round, where t i ∈ [0.1,2.0] is i's tolerance gene. The rationale behind the introduction of the tolerance gene is to open the possibility for the evolution of more complex strategies, e.g., non-discriminating givers (g i ≈ 10, ti ≈ 0.1) or highly discriminating givers (g i ≤ 5, t i ≈ 2). Surprisingly, this complexification of the model has almost no effect, since in all the simulation runs the average t i values tend to approximate one. The author's explanation is that the tolerance gene does not affect the agents' outcomes and, hence, it is not a target of the selection processes (by admission of the author, this represents a weakness of the study). However, from another point of view this result represents a further confirmation of the strength of the indirect reciprocity strategy, which, also in the Takahashi study, simply outperforms all other possibilities, just as it did in the Nowak and Sigmund (1998b) study.
The Dynamics of the Trust Game
Notwithstanding the success of reputation-based strategies, a paradox reduces their strength: in refusing to cooperate with a 'bad' player (i.e. a player who did not cooperate in the previous rounds), a discriminating player also becomes bad and will therefore pay a cost, in terms of less cooperation from other discriminating players in the subsequent rounds. This causes a collective action problem: the punishment of bad players represents a collective benefit since it reduces the probability of future defection. However, no rational player is interested in paying the cost of the punishment in order to provide this public good (akin to Hardin's generalized trustworthiness) in a setting where the partnerships change frequently (Nowak and Sigmund 2005 ; see also Yamagishi 1986) . Notwithstanding the fact that empirical research shows that many individuals are willing to pay a cost in order to punish defecting players even if this behavior is not in their rational interest (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Gäcther 2000, 2002) , this paradox represents an important factor that the above analyses did not take into consideration.
While our main motivation in using a TG lies in its efficacy in modeling non-simultaneous exchange situations, it is worth noting that using a TG instead of an indirect reciprocity or a PD game enables the above paradox to be avoided. Since in a TG the reputation of being trustworthy is based on the second player moves only, first players will pay no cost by refusing to cooperate with an opponent with a bad reputation. Low-reputation second players are hence punished, but this action is in the individual interest of first players trying to avoid the 'sucker' payoff and does not represent a collective action problem. This allows us to focus the analysis on the dynamics of trust and reciprocity without taking into account any second-order collective action problem.
More generally, there is a considerable difference between the dynamics of the PD and the TG due to the fact that the latter game is sequential and asymmetrical. Nowak and Sigmund (1994) explore analytically the differences between the iterated simultaneous and non-simultaneous PD (a game that has strong similarities with the TG). They found that the strategies more likely to produce cooperation are different in the two cases: a 'win-stay, lose-shift' one 3 for the former and a strategy similar to a generous TFT for the latter. In addition, in order to achieve cooperation, a longer memory of past interactions is needed in the non-simultaneous PD than in the simultaneous one.
Another major difference between the PD and the TG has already been highlighted at the beginning of this section: the fact that there is no mixed strategy able to lead to a result better than the non-cooperative equilibrium one in the PD, while this happens when Player II plays C with probability in the TG. From this point of view, the TG really represents a risk situation for Player I, where trusting or not the opponent, in Dasgupta's (1999) terms, represents a crucial decision. A few works have explicitly used the TG in order to study social and economic exchange situations. Bernd Lahno (1995) analyzes the conditions for rational cooperation in elementary TGs. His main findings regard the positive effect of social interaction, reputation, and the possibility of leaving a cheating partner. In another paper, Vincent Buskens (1998) studies the effect of different network structures on the trust of actors involved in repeated interactions having a TG structure. While the network analysis implications of the work are not especially relevant for our model, some of his findings have a general applicability. First, network structures that favor the transmission of information regarding trustees' past behaviors appear to strengthen cooperation in the system. Moreover, this effect is especially important when the interaction conditions become more 'difficult' for the trustor; e.g., when the probability of future interaction decreases, the temptation payoff increases and the amount of the possible sanction for the cheater (i.e. the difference R -P) decreases. As a whole, these works highlighted the role of the available information in fostering cooperation in TG-based settings, a result that drove us to design our model in such a way that it was able to permit a careful exploration of the effects of this factor on the cooperation dynamics (see below).
As far as we know, the problem of the development of cooperation in a TG situation has been previously explored by only one agent-based simulation work. Andreas Diekmann and Wojtek Przepiorka (2005) model the interaction between buyers and sellers on internet auction platforms using a tournament-style analysis derived from Axelrod's (1984) work. The authors found an important, but insufficient, effect of reputation on the development of cooperative strategies in that setting. They argue that 'cooperation can be established to a large extent -but not completely -in the absence of an external enforcer' since a small number of noncooperative actors remains 'able to hold their ground even in the presence of a reputation mechanism' (Diekmann and Przepiorka 2005: 6) . This interesting result is, unfortunately, not further discussed by the authors, but it is worth noting that it is entirely consistent with the analysis presented at the beginning of this section.
A final theoretical point of interest for our work concerns the relation between trust and reputation. The two factors are obviously linked in most social situations. For instance, Partha Dasgupta (1999: 33) argued that 'trust is based on reputation, and reputation is acquired on the basis of observed behavior over time. Reputation is an asset, so people invest in it, in that they forego immediate gains for the purpose of enjoying benefits later.' In a more formal model, Elinor Ostrom (1998) advanced the hypothesis of a strict relationship between trust, reputation, and reciprocity. These three components outline a mutual reinforcing system where high levels of trustworthy reputation positively affect the possibility that subjects will trust their interacting partner and henceforth choose to behave cooperatively. Since a cooperative move made by any subject increases the total system reputation, this, in turn, reinforces all other components in the system in a positive feedback loop resulting in the increase of cooperation in the system. On the other hand, the existence of positive feedback relations means that any decrease in one of the components impacts on the other components of the system and ultimately results in a downward spiral leading to low cooperation levels.
This suggests that a system where trust, reputation, and reciprocity are strictly linked in a positive feedback relationship is likely to assume only two states: one where the cooperation level is high and one where it is low, while intermediate cooperation levels are less likely. If this idea is right, a relatively thin threshold should mark the transition between the high and low cooperation equilibrium and even close initial configurations may therefore end in very different states. This point will be further examined in the discussion section.
The Model
Summarizing the previous sections, three basic ideas may be extracted from the existing literature. (i) Indirect reciprocity must work alongside direct reciprocity in order to achieve cooperation in settings where interaction is not strictly limited to dyadic repeated encounters. (ii) A strict relationship exists between trust, reputation, and reciprocity where those elements are linked by positive feedback. (iii) Any social structure (e.g. dense social networks) that favors the spreading of information about trustees' past behavior helps the development of reputation-based strategies able to increase cooperation in the system.
It is worth noting that most of the literature on reputation quoted above explores only deterministic strategies and/or uses settings allowing only a limited set of strategies. This is mainly due to the intrinsic limitations of the game-theoretical approach, which needs to define relatively simple settings in order to derive clear-cut results. However, even the simulation model designed by Diekmann and Przepiorka (2005) explores only a limited number of deterministic strategies, mainly because of its authors' choice of employing a tournament approach. The strategies used by the agents in our model are instead stochastic (see below): as in Diekmann and Przepiorka, their moves are affected by the opponent reputation, but their choices are probabilistic and not fixed. This is a major difference also from the Takahashi (2000) approach, since our agents can 'make mistakes' and, for instance, defect even when cooperation is widespread in the system. The development of a probabilistic approach for the modeling of agent strategies offers the advantage of representing a more realistic world -encompassing noise, trembling hands, errors, uncertainty, bounded rationality, etc. -instead of an abstract world of perfect, fully rational machines.
Another important point is that our study employs an evolutionary approach. What is especially relevant here is that, in every generation of the simulation, we introduce in the 'competition' a small proportion of mutant agents, which are different from their parents and hence able to test new strategies. This allows the model to evaluate a much greater range of strategies than any game-theoretical analysis or tournamentstyle simulation, where the strategies are fixed in advance, could do. In other words, even if the number of initial strategies used in the tournament is rather large, the number of possible strategies that can be employed in iterated TGs is incalculably greater. In order to overcome this problem, instead of defining in advance the strategies to be employed by our agents, we will start each run of the model with a different random distribution of strategies. The model is then free to select the best of the existing strategies and to test new ones using standard mutation and selection tools. Using this methodology, we are able to test a better sample of the universe of all possible strategies in a repeated TG setting (see Nowak and Sigmund 1992) .
Another difference from most of the previous studies is that our agents are not stuck in the role of either first or second player. The agent roles are instead randomly defined at the beginning of each interaction. This implies the need to build more complex strategies that comprehend and are successful in both positions in order to succeed in the competition. This extension of the model is challenging, since it allows us to explore a world where roles are no longer fixed but may change throughout the 'lifetime' of agents, which better mirrors the complexity of real life. Finally, our model is designed to explore the interplay between direct and indirect reciprocity thanks to the control of the agent matching routines and of the information they possess and employ (see below and Table 1 ). This is a major difference from past researches, which usually modeled agents able to employ either direct reciprocity strategies (e.g., Axelford 1984; Nowak and Sigmund 1992) or indirect reciprocity strategies (e.g., Diekmann and Przepiorka 2005; Nowak and Sigmund 1998b; Takahashi 2000) , but not capable of switching between them.
More formally, our model consists of a population of n = 1000 agents, which play a TG for g = 10,000 generations. We chose to employ an n value larger than that generally used in similar evolutionary models (usually a few hundred agents) in order to reduce the problems of random genetic drift that affected some of them (see Leimar and Hammerstein 2001) . In past research, random drift problems have been compared mainly by studying populations formed by a number of different small groups (Bowles and Gintis 2004; Leimar and Hammerstein 2001) . However, this strategy introduces the possibility of the evolution of altruistic behaviors due to group selection (Nowak and Sigmund 2005) , a process that is relevant in itself but is not the remit of this work. In contrast, having a single large group instead of many small ones permits the reduction of random drift effects without introducing group selection processes.
Each generation in our model consists of σ = 24 periods of interaction. In every period agents are paired and play the TG depicted in Figure 1 either as first or as second player. If Player I moves right (the distrustful/non-cooperative move) both agents earn 1 point and the interaction stops; if Player I moves down (the trustful/cooperative move), Player II may either move right (the untrustworthy/non-cooperative move), earning 5 points while Player I earns 0 points, or move down (the trustworthy/ cooperative move), which results in a payoff of 3 points for both players.
Each agent i ∈ {1, ...,n} is defined by two parameters (p i , q i ), where p i , q i , ∈ [0,1], that will hereafter be referred to as agent i characters. The first one, p i , represents the probability of moving down for agent i when acting in the first player position, while q i represents the probability of moving down for agent i when acting in the second player position. In less formal terms, the value of p i represents a measure of agent i trust, while the value of q i represents its trustworthiness. Each couple (p i , q i ) identifies a strategy where behaviors are probabilistic except when both p i and q i fall in the extremes of the interval. This permits the modeling of stochastic strategies, without renouncing the possibility of the evolution of deterministic strategies such as All C, All D or TFT, which represent extreme cases where both p i and q i take the values of 0 or 1.
The values of p i and q i are randomly assigned at the beginning of the first generation and evolve throughout the simulation. At the end of every generation, each agent generates a number of offspring proportional to the sum of the payoffs earned during the periods forming the generation. Each offspring inherits the character of its parent. However, both p i and q i have a µ = 0.005 probability of mutation. When a mutation occurs, the value of the mutant character is randomly assigned. At the end of the reproduction process, n offspring are randomly selected in order to form the next generation, holding constant the numeric dimension of the population.
The behavior of this model will be examined under two matching conditions and three information conditions. In the stranger matching condition agents are randomly coupled at the beginning of every period and the attribution of the player positions is also randomly defined. In the partner matching condition each pair of agents plays together a τ = 6 period sequence before being rematched. 4 The partner matching rule implies that each agent will meet only four other agents during its 'lifetime', i.e. in a generation. The attribution of the positions is random in the first period of the sequence, while agents exchange them in each subsequent period. Each of the two agents will therefore play three times as first player and three times as second player throughout the sequence.
The two matching conditions have relevant implications regarding the possibility of establishing direct vs. indirect reciprocity strategies. In the stranger matching condition only indirect reciprocity is possible, since the possibility of being recoupled for the same two agents is negligible, whereas direct reciprocity is also possible under the partner matching condition. Therefore, if simulations lead to similar cooperation levels, keeping all parameters equal and varying only the matching condition, this will indicate the prevalent effect of indirect reciprocity. Conversely, if the partner matching condition leads, all other things being equal, to higher cooperation, this will indicate that direct reciprocity plays a stronger role.
The information conditions are basic, full information, and incomplete information. In the basic condition, agents acting as first players possess no information about their opponents and consequently choose their moves as a function of p i and q i only. The full information condition introduces reputation, in the sense that first players have full information about second-player behaviors in the previous periods of the current generation and can consequently adapt their behaviors. Each agent j ∈ {1, ..., n} is defined by a triplet (p j , q j , c j ), where p j and q j are as in the basic condition while c j is a counter that is updated when agent j moves in the second player position. At the beginning of each generation c j is set to zero (i.e., the offspring do not inherit their parent reputations) and, when agent j moves in the second player position, it is subsequently increased (decreased) by 1 with any down (right) agent j move. The probability of moving down in the full information condition for each agent i playing in the first-player position and having agent j as opponent is p i + rc j (subsequently corrected to 1 when the result is greater than 1 and to 0 when it is lower than 0), where r is the reputation effect parameter, i.e., the change in the firstplayer cooperation probability produced by a single second-player cooperative (or non-cooperative) move in the previous period(s). For instance, when r = 0.2, any cooperative move done by agent j acting as second player in the previous period(s) of the current generation increases the probability of cooperation of the interacting agent i by 20%, while any non-cooperative move decreases it by the same figure. Throughout the simulations we will explore values of r ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20}.
In the real world, information is rarely public and freely available as in our full information condition. Therefore, we designed an incomplete information condition where every time an agent j acting in the second-player position moves, only a subset of randomly extracted agents is allowed to observe its behavior and to use this information in the subsequent periods. This subset is composed of s = nk + 1 agents, where k is the proportion of the observers in the population, plus the agent acting in the first-player position paired with agent j. In the incomplete information condition, a n × n matrix C is computed where the element c ij is a counter updated every time that agent i observes agent j. As in the previous condition, c ij = 0 for every i, j ∈ {1, ..., n} at the beginning of each generation, and it is subsequently increased (decreased) by 1 with any down (right) move of agent j, but only for agents i that have been selected as observers. In the following periods, any agent i playing in the first-player position and having agent j as opponent will have a probability of moving down of p i + rc ij , corrected as above. In other terms, while in the full information condition the information regarding the past behaviors of all agents is public and shared by the whole population, in the incomplete information condition each agent possesses a different picture of other agent reputations, a picture which is, most of the time, far from accurate.
A crucial parameter in the incomplete information condition is the proportion of observers. The simulations will explore values of k ∈ {0.00, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50} while r is set equal to 0.2. Note that the case k = 0.00 is not equivalent to the basic condition, since all the agents acting in the first-player position are allowed to observe the actions of their opponents even if there are no external observers.
Having two matching conditions and three information conditions, we will explore six different experimental conditions altogether: a strangerbasic condition (SBA), a partner-basic condition (PBA), a stranger-full information condition (SFI), a partner-full information condition (PFI), a stranger-incomplete information condition (SII), and a partner-incomplete information condition (PII). Table 1 gives an overview of the parameters used throughout the experimental conditions.
Due to the number of stochastic elements in the simulation, we will run 30 replications for each parameter configuration of each experimental condition and consider their average results. The standard indicators that will be compared across the conditions are the average payoff per interaction (av_pay), the proportion of the generations reaching highly cooperative results, i.e. with average payoffs > 2 (pr_ov2), and the average values of p i , q i and rc ij (or rc j ) (aver_p, aver_q and av_rep respectively). All indicators are computed from generation 100 onwards.
100
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Results
Basic Conditions
The basic information condition led to a picture of extremely low cooperation for both the stranger (av_pay = 1.1094) and the partner matching conditions (av_pay = 1.1113) (see Table 2 ): agents acting as first players rarely decided to trust their opponents and, even when this happened, in most cases they were exploited by non-reciprocating second players. In all the runs, the average values of both p i and q i , starting from intermediate levels (due to the randomness of the first generation), fell close to zero in less than 100 generations, leading the average payoff per interaction to settle close to the non-cooperative equilibrium (i.e., one point). 5 Occasional bursts of cooperation could occur, but persisted for a limited number of generations and never produced an average generation payoff higher than 2. The differences between the stranger and the partner matching conditions are small and neither qualitatively nor statistically significant for all the indicators.
Full Information Conditions
Setting r = 0.01 in the full information condition led to similar results, with the average payoff per interaction equal to 1.1159 for the stranger BRAVO & TAMBURINO: THE EVOLUTION OF TRUST 101 Table 1 . Overview of experimental parameters
Stranger matching Partner matching
Basic n = 1000 n = 1000 g = 10000 g = 10000 σ = 24 σ = 24 µ = 0.005 µ = 0.005 τ = 6
Full information n = 1000 n = 1000 g = 10000 g = 10000 σ = 24 σ = 24 µ = 0.005 µ = 0.005 r ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20} r ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20} τ = 6
Incomplete information n = 1000 n = 1000 g = 10000 g = 10000 σ = 24 σ = 24 µ = 0.005 µ = 0.005
.00, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50} k ∈ {0.00, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50} τ = 6 distribution.
matching condition and to 1.1191 for the partner one (see Table 3 ). Even if a t test shows that the results are statistically different both between the SBA and the SFI 0.01 and between the PBA and the PFI 0.01 conditions (p < 0.001 for all the indicators except for pr_ov2 where the test could not be computed), qualitatively the broad picture of a noncooperative system does not change. No qualitatively substantial differences exist between the partner and the stranger matching conditions for all the examined r values in the full information condition, even if the statistical differences between the two matching conditions are sometimes significant. This suggests that, in a system where the information regarding the past behavior of other agents is public, having repeated interaction with the same partner or not does not change the equilibrium since everyone is able to observe everyone else and consequently to 102 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 20(1) modify his/her behavior. In other terms, the eventual spread of cooperation is due to the use of indirect rather than direct reciprocity strategies. Considering r = 0.05 somewhat increased the cooperation in the system even if the general picture of a low cooperative world persists. Average payoffs are 1.2180 for the SFI 0.05 condition and 1.2368 for the PFI 0.05 condition (see Table 3 ). Bursts of cooperation from a floor of universal defection are now possible, but rare. However, it is worth noting that the average value of q i starts to rise to about 0.25, i.e., a first-player down move will be reciprocated about 25% of the time. This suggests that, even with a reputation effect as low as 0.05, it starts to pay (at least slightly) to have a trustworthy reputation and that this effect may be increased by higher r.
The picture changes for the setting r = 0.10: average payoffs are now close to 2.5 for both the stranger and the partner matching conditions and above 2 in all the considered generations. It is worth noting that the average value of p i rises dramatically to 0.9, while the average value of q i remains slightly below 0.5 (see Table 3 ). This means that, in most cases, agents in the first-player position choose to be trustful, notwithstanding the fact that the probability of being cheated is about 0.5. However, this is hardly surprising since first players are now able to discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy opponents and even a high p i has little influence against a strongly untrustworthy reputation of the opponent (i.e. a very high rc j ). In other terms, in a world of public information the existence of a general 'blind' trust, indicated by a high p i , has little effect (except in the first period of the generation) since every agent knows exactly what their opponents did in the previous periods and can consequently adapt its behavior.
Settings r = 0.20 produced a further increase in the average payoffs. This happened mainly thanks to a rise in the average q i values, which consequently reduced the probability of non-cooperative moves by second players. It is worth noting that average reputation values that remained steadily close to or below zero for lower amounts of r rose up over 0.5, testifying to a general trustworthiness of the population.
Incomplete Information Conditions
The results obtained in the incomplete information conditions are heavily dependent on the proportion of observers and, unlike the previous cases, interesting differences exist between the stranger and the partner matching conditions (see Table 4 ). The case k = 0.00 shows only small differences compared to the basic condition. However, while the average payoff obtained in the SII 0.00 condition is akin to the SBA condition one, that for the PII 0.00 is somewhat greater than and significantly different (t = 38.5, p < 0.001) from the PBA one. The difference between the stranger and partner conditions suggests that when the information regarding past behavior of other agents is not public, the possibility of building a picture of the specific opponent offered by partner matching is valuable and can change the state of the system. In other terms, when agents possess reliable information regarding their opponents but only imperfect information on most of the other agents, the possibility of using direct instead of (or besides) indirect reciprocity strategies matters. This is especially clear when it is observed that setting k = 0.25 already leads to high cooperation levels in the partner condition, while k = 0.50 is needed to obtain the same result in the stranger condition.
It is worth noting that when high cooperation levels are reached, while the p i average value tends to be over 0.9, the q i one remains around 0.5, just as in the SFI/PFI 0.10 conditions. However, in a world of incomplete information, agents cannot consistently base their decisions on the reputations of their opponents since the available information is incomplete and hence hardly reliable. The high values of p i have, therefore, a different meaning: they suggest that something similar to a generalized trust emerges in the system. By emergence of a generalized trust, we mean that the micro-level effect of trust is independent of the corresponding effect of reputation. First players are more likely to be trustful even if they do not know anything 104 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 20(1) about their opponents' past behaviors, as may frequently happen, especially in the stranger matching condition. Most agents will therefore start cooperatively any interaction with an 'unknown' opponent and only subsequently adapt their moves as a function of the other's behavior, a clear example of a direct reciprocity strategy.
To sum up, in the incomplete information conditions a substantial proportion of observers is needed in order to burst the increase in cooperation. On the other hand, the emergence of generalized trust seems to be a property of systems where information regarding the past behavior of agents can sufficiently spread. This outcome is favored by repeated interaction with the same agent, as in the partner matching conditions, since in this case the possibility of building a reliable image of the opponents and of using direct reciprocity strategies helps the trustful agents to overcome the information restrictions. Finally, it is worth noting that a trustful world does not necessarily imply a trustworthy one. Even in highly cooperative environments, a non-negligible proportion of agents with relatively low q i survives, i.e., reputation seems able to boost cooperation but is not capable of completely ruling out opportunistic behaviors.
Discussion and Conclusions
A number of theoretical and empirical works have shown that reputation plays a crucial role in the establishment of cooperative regimes in PDtype situations or, more generally, in situations characterized by collective action problems (see above). Buskens (1998) , Diekmann and Przepiorka (2005) , and Lahno (1995) found a similar outcome also for iterated TG settings. Our model replicates and extends those results, confirming the important role of indirect reciprocity in supporting cooperation. Nevertheless, when repeated interaction between the same two players occurs, direct reciprocity may also play a role, as shown by the results of the partner matching conditions. Notwithstanding the fact that the effect of direct reciprocity is weaker than that of indirect reciprocity, its role can be significant under specific circumstances, especially when the limits of the available information reduce the strength of indirect reciprocity. Direct and indirect reciprocity are actually more complementary than alternative in fostering cooperation. More specifically, direct reciprocity seems to be able to support indirect reciprocity when the information on the opponent is incomplete, while indirect reciprocity works well also in conditions of continuous rematching of the interacting partners where direct reciprocity strategies cannot work.
A second important outcome of the model is the emergence of generalized trust (but not of generalized trustworthiness) in the system. This result arises from the analysis of both the full and the incomplete information conditions and is especially relevant in the light of Ostrom's (1998) model, since the evolution of generalized trust appears to be an emergent property of systems allowing the formation of individual reputations and the possibility of playing reciprocity strategies (either direct or indirect).
At first glance, it looks quite surprising that generalized trust strategies, leading first players close to unconditional cooperation, may evolve even when the possibility of being cheated is significant. However, this result is consistent with the analysis presented above. By replacing the values corresponding to T, R, P and S in the inequalities (1) and (2), we obtain the two critical thresholds of the game: q -> 1/3 and p -> 0.3, where q -and p -represent the average q i and p i . Notice that, in the runs that succeeded in reaching high cooperation levels, the actual q -are usually around 0.5. This figure is well below the 1/3 threshold and explains why first players cooperate even with a 50% probability of being cheated. More generally, it is worth noting that in none of the runs that succeeded in reaching cooperative regimes did the q -or the p -values fall below the thresholds identified above.
Remember that the maintaining of q -above the critical value of 1/3 -i.e., of something akin to a public good that we could name 'sufficient generalized trustworthiness' -represents a collective action problem for second players. The simulations actually showed that, without reputation, this problem remains unsolved. Nevertheless, when reputation is introduced into the game, it pays (or, at least, it is less costly) for second players to build a trustworthy reputation, and a sufficient number of trustworthy agents remain in the game long enough to permit the maintaining of q -above the critical value of 1/3. When this q -level is reached in the system, it starts to be convenient for first players to further trust their opponents and hence to develop generalized trust. On the other hand, excessively fair second players continue to be negatively selected over moderately trustworthy ones, who reach better results in a highly trustful environment, a fact that explains why q -values do not approach 1 as the p -values do.
The reasoning above explains how high p i agents can live side by side with agents having intermediate q i values, but it masks another fundamental result of the simulations: the achievement of either low or high cooperation levels, with no run ending in intermediate states. This is clear from Figure 2 : in 11 out of the 18 analyzed conditions the average payoff is below 1.3 points, while in all the remaining conditions it exceeds 2.1 points. The system seems to be able to reach only two states: one close to the non-cooperative equilibrium and one at about 3/4 of the cooperative optimum. No intermediate states are stable and any trend leading to this no-man's land can only be transitory and either finally settles down in one of the two equilibria or, in extreme cases, produces a never-ending oscillation between them (see below). This point is further supported by observing the plot in Figure 3 : both p -and q -values always tend to concentrate either on the lower left or on the upper right side of the figure, leaving blank the remaining area.
If the system possesses two equilibria, we should be able to identify the threshold values dividing them, given the simulation parameters and conditions. A rough estimate can be done through Tables 3 and 4 by observing the relationship between the model parameters and the resulting average payoffs. This analysis suggests that the threshold value for r is located between 0.05 and 0.10 in both the SFI and the PFI conditions, while that for k is located between 0.25 and 0.50 in the SII condition and between 0.10 and 0.25 in the PII condition. In order to reach more accurate estimates, we carried out further runs of the model with the parameters set close to the above values. Figure 4 relates to the SFI condition: setting r ≤ 0.05 leads to a stable attainment of the non-cooperative equilibrium in a few hundred generations, while for values of r ≥ 0.08 high cooperation levels are enduringly achieved. On the other hand, r = 0.06 draws an erratic line moving between high and low cooperation states. This is already no longer true for r = 0.07, suggesting that the crucial value of the parameter r in the SII condition should be very close to 0.06. In a tiny interval around this figure small changes in the parameter value (it is worth remembering that a 0.01 change of the parameter r means an increase or a decrease in the firstplayer cooperation probability by 1% only) lead to very different outcomes in terms of cooperation. The situation is analogous in the PFI condition, with the line corresponding to r = 0.06 showing erratic behavior, while values both above and below this figure lead to relatively stable states. A similar analysis for the SII condition led us to identify a k threshold between 0.30 and 0.35 (possibly closer to 0.35), while in the PII condition the critical value is between 0.15 and 0.20. As a whole, in the full information condition any small change in the reputation effect is sufficient to create or to destroy cooperative opportunities in the system when r ≈ 0.06, while in the incomplete information conditions the threshold value for k ranges from onefifth (PII) to one-third (SII). However, what is important is not the specific positioning of the thresholds, which are heavily dependent on the other parameters used in the model, but the very fact of their existence.
In summary, our model shows that, in non-simultaneous exchange settings, cooperation is possible if: (1) actors are able to modify to a substantial degree their behavior in response to their opponents' reputation and (2a) the information regarding actors' reputations is sufficiently spread and reliable or (2b) repeated interactions between the same two players allow them to build mutual (as opposed to general) trust and hence to use direct reciprocity strategies in support of the indirect reciprocity ones.
These results are consistent with most of the past literature findings, but are especially interesting in the light of the Ostrom (1998) trust-reputationreciprocity model. These three elements are clearly strictly linked, and the positive feedback cycle between them represents a plausible explanation of the system behavior. Generalized trust emerges when reputation is allowed to produce an increase in cooperative actions through the use of both direct and indirect reciprocity strategies. However, when one of the elements is weakened (as in the incomplete information conditions), this rapidly leads the system to settle down close to its non-cooperative equilibrium. The thresholds separating high and low cooperation states are thin, a fact that causes seemingly robust cooperation levels to break down due to apparently small changes in the parameter configurations. Similar behaviors are frequent in the social world. Simulation helped us to deepen our understanding of the theoretical relationships between trust, reputation, and reciprocity. Empirical research, in the form of both experimental and field studies, will hopefully do the same.
